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ABSTRACT 
There is a longstanding discussion on whether happiness is culturally relative or not. The 
following questions are addressed in that context:  
1)  Do we all assess how much we like our life? 
2)  Do we appraise our life on the same grounds? 
3)  Are the conditions for happiness similar for all of us? 
4)  Are the consequences of happiness similar in all cultures? 
5)  Do we all seek happiness? 
6)  Do we seek happiness in similar ways? 
7)  Do we enjoy life about equally much? 
      The available data suggest that all humans tend to assess how much they like their life. 
The evaluation draws on affective experience, which is linked to gratification of universal  
human needs and on cognitive comparison which is framed by cultural standards of the good life. 
The overall appraisal seems to depend more on the former, than on the latter source of 
information. Conditions for happiness appear to be quite similar across the world and so are 
the consequences of enjoying life or not. There is more cultural variation in the valuation of 
happiness and in beliefs about conditions for happiness. The greatest variation is found in 
how happy people are. 
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1       INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent rise of interest in happiness has revived classic discussions about the nature of 
happiness. One of these discussions centers on whether happiness is similar for all humans or 
rather something that varies across cultures. In the universalist view, happiness is comparable 
to “pain.” All humans know what pain is, will experience pain when touching a hot stove, and 
tend to avoid pain. In the relativistic view, happiness is more comparable to “beauty,” the idea 
of which varies across time and culture. Picasso’s paintings are not appreciated by everybody, 
nor does everybody seek only beauty1.  
 This discussion links up with wider issues, among which is the longstanding debate 
about the merits of utilitarian moral philosophy. Its “greatest happiness principle” assumes 
that happiness is something universal. If different in different cultures, happiness cannot serve 
for the evaluation of cultures. If culturally variable, the definition of happiness can also 
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 change over time, and happiness is therefore not a strong criterion for public choice within 
cultures. These arguments have been presented repeatedly, with few conclusions arising from 
the discussions, due to a lack of empirical proof for either position. 
In this chapter, I inspect what our new knowledge about happiness can tell us about 
this old controversy. Has a decade of empirical research made us any wiser on this matter, or 
are we still as much in the dark as the nineteenth-century armchair philosophers who 
criticized utilitarianism on this ground? 
 
 1.1      Concept of happiness 
A preliminary step is to define happiness, since some of the things denoted using this word 
can be less universal than others things called by the same name. I use the word “happiness” 
for a subjective state of mind, which I define as the overall appreciation of one’s life as –a 
whole. I have elaborated this definition in earlier publications (Veenhoven, 1984 chapter 2; 
Veenhoven, 2000). This definition fits Jeremy Bentham’s classic notion of happiness as “the 
sum of pleasures and pains.” Happiness in this sense is synonymous with “life satisfaction” 
and “subjective well-being”2.
Additionally, I distinguish two “components” of happiness: an affective component 
and a cognitive component. The affective component is how well one typically feels. I call 
this the hedonic level of affect. The cognitive component is the perceived difference between 
what one has and what one wants in life, which I call contentment. I assume that these 
components serve as subtotals in the overall evaluation of life. 
 
1.2    Sub-questions 
         The question “How universal is happiness?” is too broad to answer, since there are different 
facets of happiness, which may be more or less universal. Hence I will break down the main 
question into the following sub-questions:  
1) Do we all appraise how much we like life? 
2) Do we appraise life on the same grounds? 
3) Are the conditions for happiness similar for all humans? 
4) Are the consequences of happiness similar around the globe? 
5) Do we all seek happiness? 
6) Do we seek happiness in similar ways? 
7) Are we about equally happy in all cultures? 
 
Since the focus of this chapter is on cultural variations in the nature of happiness, I do not 
deal with the cross-cultural measurement of happiness. Cultural measurement bias may distort 
the data on which this chapter builds in several ways, but the literature suggests that the 
degree of distortion is not alarming (see, e.g., Diener & Oishi, 2004; Veenhoven, 2008c). 
Some issues in cross-cultural measurement of happiness are discussed in the chapter by Oishi 
(2009) in this volume. 
 
 Most of the empirical data used in this chapter are taken from the World Database of 
Happiness (Veenhoven, 2008), which is a collection of research findings on happiness as 
defined above. References are made to sections of this database. In each of these sections one 
can find standardized descriptions of research findings and links to the original publication. 
Citing these all separately would be unwieldy. 
 
 
2      Question 1:  
DO WE ALL APPRAISE HOW MUCH WE LIKE LIFE?  
 
Above, I distinguished between overall happiness and its components and assumed that the 
components serve as subtotals in the overall evaluation of life. Do all humans appraise their 
life in these ways?  
 
2.1    Hedonic level of affect  
Like other higher animals, humans experience positive and negative affects. This is not just 
something we know from our own experience, it is also something we can recognize in the 
facial expressions of other people all over the world (Ekman, 1970). Using brain imaging we 
can now also observe part of the neural processes that make us feel so (e.g., Davidson, 2004) 
and these neurological structures do not differ across cultures either3.   
 The balance of positive and negative affects is reflected in the hedonic tone of 
“mood.” Though mood is something we are aware of, it is mostly not in the foreground of our 
consciousness. Still, it is assessable, and we can estimate how well we feel most of the time. 
Babies are not yet able to engage in such reflection, but they still experience happy or 
unhappy moods. Although they cannot report how they typically feel, their mood level can be 
assessed using behavioral indications. This case of babies illustrates that one can be happy 
without having a concept of happiness in mind. 
 Adult humans know typically how well they feel most of the time and this appears in 
the practice of measurement. When asked how well they usually feel, people answer instantly. 
The non-response rate tends to be small. Self-ratings of average hedonic level do not differ 
much from the balance scores scientists compute from responses to multiple questions about 
specific affects4 and do not differ substantially from ratings based on experience sampling5 or 
from ratings by intimates6. 
 
2.2    Contentment 
         Unlike their fellow animals, humans can develop ideas of what they want from life and then 
compare these aspirations with the realities of their life. This faculty is not present from birth 
on, but develops on the road to adulthood. There is no doubt that all adults have wants, even 
ascetics who want to denounce all wants still have the desire to denounce wants. There is also 
no doubt that most adults have an idea of how well their wants are being met, at least about 
important wants. Wants are often not very specific, and few people have clear priorities in 
1.3    Data source 
 mind; nevertheless, most people have no problem in estimating of how successful they are in 
getting what they want from life. 
 Several survey studies have involved questions about what one wants from life and the 
degree to which one sees these wants being met. A common question is: “So far, I have gotten 
the important things I want in life” (item in Diener’s “Satisfaction with Life Scale,” Diener et 
al., 1985). The responses tend to be prompt, and the percentage of respondents who use the 
“Don’t know” option is very low. So, apparently, this question links up with something 
people have in mind. 
 Even if people have no overall judgment of success already in mind, they appear able 
and willing to make one when asked. This appears in the practice of focused interviews, in 
life-review interviews in particular. Like in the case of hedonic level it is not required that 
people have made up their mind: an external observer can estimate someone’s overall 
contentment based on that person’s reported success in meeting specific wants.  
 
2.3    Overall happiness   
Given the above, it is no surprise that people have no problem in reporting how much they 
like their life-as-a-whole. Responses to questions on overall happiness are typically prompt. If 
not, happiness would not be such a common item in survey research. The non-response level 
to questions on happiness is typically low. Fewer than 1 percent use the “Don’t know” 
option7, and few people skip the question8. (See Scheme 1.) Non-response is much higher on 
questions about other issues such as income and political preference. Questions on life-
satisfaction are also easily answered in non-modern societies, such as the Inughuit, the Amish, 
and the Maasai (Biswas-Diener et al., 2005).  
 
  
3       Question 2:  
DO WE APPRAISE LIFE ON THE SAME GROUNDS?  
 
As mentioned above, I assume that we appraise our life in two ways: affectively, by assessing 
how well we feel; and cognitively, by comparing life-as-it-is with how we want-life-to-be. 
This theory is summarized in Scheme 2. 
 
3.1    Hedonic level depends on gratification of universal “needs”  
Why can we experience pleasure and pain? The biological function is evidently to signal that 
things are good or bad for us. Evolution has programmed us this way. What, then, is the 
function of mood? Clearly not to signal specific benefit or danger: unlike pleasure and pain, 
moods are typically not related to specific stimuli and certainly not average mood level over 
longer periods of time. Mood level seems to function as a meta-signal and indicates how well 
we are doing on the whole. Feeling good means that all lights are on green and that we can go 
ahead, while feeling bad means that there is something wrong and that we should check what 
 that is. This affective signal mechanism seems to exist in all higher animals, and its neural 
basis is found in the evolutionarily eldest parts of the human brain. 
What, then, is “doing well”? I assume, but cannot prove, that this is meeting innate 
“needs.” Needs are requirements for functioning that are so essential that evolution has 
safeguarded their gratification by linking these functions to affective signals. This is pretty 
evident in the case if “deficiency needs” such as hunger, but it seems also to apply to “growth 
needs” such as curiosity9.  
In this view, happiness is rooted in the gratification of basic needs that are part of 
human nature. In that respect happiness draws on universal grounds. I have discussed this 
theory in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven, 1991, 2009). 
 
3.2    Contentment depends on meeting culturally variable “wants”  
Why do we have wants? Mainly to gratify universal needs. In lower animals, needs are met by 
means of instinctive behaviors. The human strategy is more flexible than that and allows need 
gratification though planned behavior. “Wants” are a part of that planning.  
What do we want? Part of the answer is that we tend to adopt current standards of the 
good life; e.g., the standard of what material level of living is desirable and possible. These 
standards vary across time and culture; today we want more material comfort than our great-
grandparents could dream of, and standards are higher in American business circles than in 
Tibetan monasteries. 
In this view, happiness is rooted in social standards and in this respect is culturally 
relative. For a recent statement of this view, see Chambers (1999). 
 
3.3    Affective experience dominates in the overall evaluation of life 
In this line of thought, the question of how universal “happiness” is boils down to the 
question which of these two ways of appraising life is the most important. I have considered 
this question in earlier publications (Veenhoven, 1991, 2009) and concluded that affective 
experience dominates the overall evaluation of life. Below I will summarize the main 
arguments and present some more evidence. 
 
3.3.1 Theoretical plausibility  
From an evolutionary point of view it is not plausible that cognitive contentment dominates 
our overall appraisal of life. Cognition developed much later and serves as an addition to 
affective appraisal rather than a substitute. Reason helps explain why we feel good or bad and 
allows detection of false affective signals, although it is difficult to ignore these, as 
depressives can tell you. Affective appraisal tends to precede cognitive decision (Zajonc, 
1984), and without affective appraisal we cannot come to a decision, as cases of brain damage 
demonstrate (Damasio, 1994). From this perspective it is also unlikely that humans orient by 
variable cultural standards in the first place, rather than by needs that are rooted in biological 
evolution10. 
 The limited role of cognitive comparison is also illustrated by the fact that it does not 
exist in little children, who as yet have no idea of what they want from life. Still, it is clear 
 that children can be happy or unhappy, and there is typically no great change in happiness 
when they develop wants.   
 
3.3.2 Empirical indications 
Since we cannot (yet) look into people’s heads, there is no direct empirical evidence of the 
relative strength of both ways of appraising life. Still, there are several indirect indications. 
 
Overall happiness more correlated to affect than contentment:  
If affective experience dominates the overall appraisal of life, this must appear in sizable 
correlations with overall happiness and more sizable correlations than with contentment. 
Unfortunately, there are no reports of studies involving measures of all three of these variants 
of happiness, so we must make do with studies that correlated either happiness with affect or 
overall happiness with contentment. The findings of such studies are stored in the World 
Database of Happiness, which distinguishes measures of overall happiness (coded “O”), 
measures of affect level (coded “A”) and measures of contentment (coded “C”). 
 Eight studies link self-ratings of overall happiness and average affect and find an 
average correlation of +.7011. Another 13 studies relate responses to global questions on 
overall happiness and contentment and find an average correlation of +.4612. Not surprisingly, 
the correlation between hedonic level and contentment is weaker. The average in three studies 
is +.4013. An even lower correlation was observed in the recent Gallup World Poll, the 
correlation between Best–Worst possible life and Yesterday’s Affect being around +.20 
(Harter & Arora, 2009). 
 
Happy with unfulfilled aspirations: 
If happiness depends on seeing one’s wants met, people must be unhappy when they have 
unfulfilled aspirations and increasingly unhappy the more unfulfilled aspirations they have. 
Yet people with unfulfilled aspirations appear to be happier than people without, and more so 
the more unfulfilled aspirations they have (Wessman, 1965, p. 210)14. This finding fits better 
with the theory that we have an innate need to use our potentials, since unfulfilled aspirations 
provide an aim to achieve. 
 
Happy in spite of value–reality gap in nation: 
 If contentment drives happiness in the first place, we can expect that people are happier in 
nations where the values endorsed are perceived to be met than in nations where a gap 
between value and reality is perceived to exist. This is not always the case; for instance, not 
with “gender equality” and “human orientation” as measured in the Globe study in 62 
societies (House et al., 2004). Average happiness is higher in nations where the widest gaps 
between ideal and reality are perceived to exist on these issues, probably because this marks 
respect for humanistic values. 
  The right arrow in Scheme.2 denotes a “bottom-up” effect of contentment on overall 
happiness. Above, I have interpreted the observed correlations in this way. Yet causality can 
also be “top-down,” overall happiness affecting the perception of the gap between what one 
wants and what one has. Analysis of a panel study has shown that causality typically works 
this way. In this study, discrepancies (gaps) were assessed between how respondents rated 
their present life on a 20-step scale and ratings of what they wanted from life (expectations, 
aspirations, entitlements) on the same ladder scale. Comparison over time showed a 
significant top-down effect but no bottom-up effect (Headey & Veenhoven, 1989, p. 117). So 
it seems that contentment is largely driven by happiness. If we feel good, we infer that we 
have most of the things we want, and if we feel bad we start looking for what we might miss.  
Though affect seems to dominate the overall appraisal of life, it does not dominate 
equally everywhere. Correlations between overall happiness and affect balance tend to be 
stronger in individualistic nations than in collectivist ones (Suh et al., 1998). Likewise, the 
relative weight of positive and negative affect differs somewhat across cultures. Negative 
affect is more strongly correlated to overall happiness in individualistic nations than in 
collectivist ones, while positive affect correlates more with overall happiness in nations where 
self-expression values are endorsed than in nations where the focus is more on survival 
(Kuppens et al., 2008). (Scheme 3) 
 
  
 
 
 
4       Question 3:  
ARE CONDITIONS FOR HAPPINESS SIMILAR ACROSS CULTURES?  
 
Do we need the same conditions to be happy? Or can some people be happy in conditions that 
render other people unhappy? Below, I will consider this question on two levels: the macro 
level of nations and at the micro level of individuals within nations. 
 
4.1     Much uniformity in societal requirements for happiness 
Average happiness differs markedly across nations: the highest average on a 0 to 10 scale is 
currently observed in Denmark (8.4) and the lowest in Zimbabwe (3.2)15. There is a clear 
system in these differences. People live more happily in the most modern nations, in 
particular in nations characterized by economic development, freedom, rule of law, and good 
governance. The societal characteristics set out in Scheme 4 explain no fewer than 75 percent 
of the differences in average happiness in nations16. Societal progress in these matters is 
likely to have fostered the recent rise of happiness in modern nations (e.g., Inglehart et al., 
2008). 
 Interestingly, the societal conditions that make people happy are not always the 
conditions they value. For instance, average happiness is markedly lower in nations where 
women are discriminated against (ChinHonFoei, 2007), but this practice is widely approved 
  
Happiness drives contentment rather than the reverse: 
 in most of these countries. Likewise, corruption brings down happiness even in societies 
where favoritism is seen as a moral obligation. 
 
4.2    Much uniformity in required living conditions within nations 
There are also differences in individual happiness within nations. In a happy country like 
Denmark, 5 percent of the people still rate 5 or lower on the 0–10 scale, and in an unhappy 
country like Zimbabwe, some 13 percent score 8 or higher. Are the reasons for high and low 
scores similar across nations? Below, I consider some living conditions for which cross-
national data are available.  
 
Freedom 
Not only is average happiness higher in free countries, but within countries individuals are 
also happier the more control they have over their life. This appears, among other things, in 
strong correlations between personal happiness and perceived freedom and control all over 
the world17.  
 
Social rank 
People are typically happier on the upper steps of the social ladder than at the bottom. This 
appears in findings on relative income position18, occupational prestige19, subjective class 
identification20 and indexes of socio-economic status21. The differences tend to be bigger at 
the lower end of the hierarchy. Though the correlations with happiness differ in size, they are 
positive all over the world. This finding fits the view that we have an innate need for social 
respect. Like other group animals, we are hardwired to avoid a bottom position. 
 
Marriage 
Adults are typically happier when living with a spouse than when single. The difference is 
around half a point on scale from 0–10 and is largely independent of income, gender, and age. 
Again the size of the difference varies somewhat across time and nations, but the pattern is 
clearly universal22. This finding fits the view that we are social animals, hardwired to form 
pairs. 
 
Personality 
Cross-national research on the relationship between happiness and personality is limited as 
yet, but the available data suggest that extroverted people tend to be happier23 across a variety 
of nations (Lucas et al., 2000) and that neurotics tend to be less happy in all cultures. Once 
more, there is difference in the size of the effects. For instance, the effect of self-esteem 
appears to be stronger in individualistic cultures than in collectivist cultures (Oishi et al., 
1999). Still the direction is the same everywhere. 
 
This is not to say that all conditions for happiness are universal. One notable exception is 
“education.” Although there is a correlation between average happiness and level of education 
 in countries, the most highly educated individuals are not always happier. Correlation 
between happiness and education vary between –.08 and +.2724.  
 
5       Question 4:  
ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HAPPINESS SIMILAR?  
Research into happiness has focused on its determinants in the first place; however, there is 
also a strand of investigation into the consequences of enjoying life or not (Veenhoven, 
1989a; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Fredrickson (2004) has summarized much of the findings 
in the “broaden and build theory” of positive affect. Although most of this research has been 
done in Western nations, the observed effects are also likely to exist in other parts of the 
world. 
 
5.1    Happiness fosters functioning 
Happiness appears to encourage engagement, while unhappiness tends to instigate 
withdrawal. This appears as greater engagement in activity at work25 and in leisure26. The 
energizing effect of happiness manifests also in social behavior: happiness predicts the 
formation of friendships27, entering marriage28and participation in voluntary organizations29. 
There is also experimental evidence of happy moods’ broadening perception and enhancing 
creativity30. All this is compatible with the above-mentioned theory that happiness works as a 
“go signal”, and that this effect seems to exists also in other higher animals. If so, the effect is 
likely to be universal. 
 
5.2    Happiness lengthens life 
Another illustrative finding is that happiness fosters physical health31 and that happiness 
therefore lengthens life considerably32. One of the mechanisms seems to be that happiness 
encourages the full functioning of mind and body and thus keeps us in shape. Another 
mechanism is probably that unhappiness triggers the fight or flight response, since it signals 
that there is something wrong. It is well known that this automatic reaction makes an 
organism economize on other functions, among them the immune response. In this line, 
Cohen (1995) has demonstrated experimentally that unhappiness makes people more 
susceptible to catching a common cold. The above are essentially biological reactions that are 
unlikely to differ much across cultures.  
Possibly there are effects of happiness that do differ across cultures, but for the time 
being, it is the universality strikes the eye.  
 
6 Question 5:  
DO WE ALL SEEK HAPPINESS?  
 
It is rather evident most humans prefer a happy life to an unhappy one. Still, this does not 
mean that happiness is the main driver in human motivation, nor that happiness is valued 
universally. 
 
 6.1  Happiness is a universal human striving, though not innate 
In the first lines of his famous Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham (1789) 
stated that human behavior is governed by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 
There is much truth in this theory of motivation, yet happiness is not the only driver of human 
behavior, at least not happiness in the sense of overall life-satisfaction. 
Like other mammals, we are driven by different needs, such as hunger, sex, love, and 
curiosity, which have developed subsequently through evolution. All these needs are linked to 
hedonic signals, but their gratification is not only sought for the sake of pleasure. For 
instance, we want sex for the sex, and we do not settle for the esthetic pleasure of reading 
poetry instead.  
Still, pleasure is a main driver of human behavior. Yet pleasure is not quite the same 
as life-satisfaction. Short-term pleasures can be at the cost of long-term happiness, and in such 
cases humans do not always look to the long term.  
Our fellow animals are driven by primary motives, but in humans consciousness also 
gives rise to secondary motives, such as figuring out who we are and seeking an answer to 
questions about the meaning of life. Wentholt (1980) calls this “universal strivings”, which he 
distinguishes from “organic needs”. The pursuit of long-term happiness is one of these 
universal strivings. Though not “innate” as such, it is an inclination that develops in most 
humans as a result of their consciousness. While this inclination manifests in all cultures, it 
does not necessarily appear in all individuals. Happiness is typically not an issue for people 
who are trying to survive in the first place, and some opt to forsake happiness for ideological 
reasons. 
 
6.2 Happiness is valued in most societies, though possibly not in all 
Happiness seems to be positively valued in all nations of our time. This is at least suggested 
by a study among university students in 47 nations in the 1990s (Diener, 2004). These 
students were asked to rate the importance of several values, such as wealth, health, and love. 
Happiness ranked highest in the importance rating, with an average of 8 on a scale of 1 to 9. 
Ratings ranged between 8.7 and 7.3, and there is thus no country in this study where 
happiness is deemed unimportant. 
This is not to say that happiness has always been prized in all human cultures. Though 
all humans have a natural inclination to pursue happiness, cultures can go against that 
inclination just as some cultures go against the natural drive for sex. What cultures denounce 
happiness? Unfortunately cultural anthropology cannot tell us, since this discipline has a blind 
eye for happiness (Thin, 2006). Still, there are indications that in the past, miserable societies 
tended to glorify suffering rather than happiness33, and that collectivist cultures emphasize the 
well-being of groups rather than the well-being of individuals.  
One can think of reasons why cultures come to depreciate happiness. When life is 
miserable, it may be comforting to believe that happiness is no good after all, and renouncing 
happiness may be functional for engaging people in common causes such as war. Next to such 
macro-societal functions, internal factors can be involved, such as cultural distinctions 
between groups in a society. This seems to have been one of the reasons for the sexual 
 abstention of religious people during the Middle Ages. The campaign “against happiness” of 
some present-day philosophers34 could be placed in a similar vein as intellectual “distinction.”    
 
7 Question 6:  
DO WE SEEK HAPPINESS IN A SIMILAR WAY?  
 
To the extent that they seek happiness, do humans do this in similar ways? This question is 
easier put than answered, since behavior is typically guided by multiple motives that cannot 
be observed as such. Still we can get a clue by looking at beliefs about conditions for 
happiness. Do universal themes dominate these beliefs or do these lay theories of happiness 
tend to be culture-specific? This question can be answered in principle, but a shortage of data 
sets limits. 
 
7.1 Variation in philosophical views gives no answer 
Can we answer this question on the basis of what prominent thinkers have said on this subject 
in different times and cultures? We can draw on a large philosophical literature about ways to 
lead a happy life35, and reviews of this literature show wide differences. Yet even though 
philosophers differ so much, public opinion need not be equally diverse. Philosophers often 
seek the difference from common opinion. Moreover, philosophers often use the term 
happiness in a broader sense than defined here and typically write about how we should seek 
happiness rather than how we actually do. So, to answer this question we need to look at 
survey research into beliefs about happiness. 
 
7.2 Survey research shows much similarity 
As yet there is more comparative research on degrees of happiness around the world than on 
beliefs about conditions for happiness. The available research on presumed conditions for 
happiness is limited to present-day nation states. These data suggest that there is quite some 
similarity across nations. 
 Most of the available research findings are about perceived sources of one’s own 
happiness36. The bulk concerns modern Western people, who tend to believe that happiness 
depends on health and good relations in the first place, and less so on material affluence and 
social prestige.  
Only a few studies have compared cultures. Chiasson & Dubé (1997) found striking 
similarities in North America and Latin American countries. Likewise, Lee et al. (1999) found 
that students in Canada and Korea employed essentially the same ordered set of perceived 
sources for happiness, in spite of considerable difference in average level of happiness. A 
recent Gallup World Survey found that a happy family life and good health are ranked high 
all over the world (see Scheme 5). 
 Belief about conditions for happiness was addressed indirectly in Cantril’s (1965) 
landmark study, “The Pattern of Human Concerns” in 16 nations in the early 1960s. This 
study involved open-ended questions about what constitutes the “best possible life” and the 
“worst possible life.” Analysis of the responses showed much similarity; the same themes 
 popped up in all countries, though not equally frequent everywhere (pp.162–167). The 
observed differences appeared to correspond more with the country’s stage of societal 
development than with its ideology (p. 302). Cantril explained these observations in terms of 
need theory (Chapter 16). 
 Studies by Tsai et al. (2007) address differences in both ideal and actual affect across 
cultures and suggest that culture influences ideal affect more than actual affect. Still, a look at 
their findings shows much similarity in ideal affect, and in particular, similarly high ratings 
for the desirability of happiness. 
 
 8 Question 7:  
ARE WE ABOUT EQUALLY HAPPY IN ALL CULTURES?  
 
The last question is about degree of happiness. Are humans about equally happy in all 
cultures, or do they live happily in some cultures and unhappily in others?  
 Some variants of the comparison theory of happiness imply that humans are about 
equally happy in all cultures. If happiness depends on social comparison with one’s 
compatriots, the average level will be about neutral in all societies. If happiness depends on 
comparison with earlier experiences over the lifetime, the average will tend to be neutral as 
well. Yet other variants of comparison theory imply that happiness can differ across cultures. 
If happiness depends on meeting local standards of the good life, happiness can be high in 
cultures where these standards can be easily met and low where the meeting of these 
standards is out of reach for most people.  
 Need-theory also implies that the level of happiness can differ across cultures. If 
happiness depends on the degree to which human needs are met, average happiness will be 
higher in societies that fit human nature well than in societies that do not. From a functional 
point of view, it is unlikely that we are equally happy irrespective of conditions. At best, 
evolution has resulted in a tendency to feel happy once conditions are tolerable. 
 The data are quite clear on this matter. There are wide differences in average 
happiness across nations (see Scheme 6). Average happiness37 is 8.2 in Denmark and only 
3.2 in Zimbabwe. Average happiness is above neutral in the present-day world38. As we have 
seen in  Scheme 4, most of these differences can be explained by national characteristics such 
as wealth, freedom, and security, which are part of “modernity.”  
 Average happiness not only differs among contemporary cultures, but also varies over 
time. The level of happiness has risen in most nations over the last 30 years, but declined in 
some (Veenhoven & Hagerty, 2006; Inglehart, 2008). Average happiness fell dramatically in 
the Russia and China following the great social changes that have taken place since the 1980s 
(Brockmann et al., 2008). Though people live more happily in modern society, the change to 
modernity tends to reduce happiness temporarily. 
There are also indications that average happiness has varied considerably over human 
history. Our forefathers seem to have been fairly happy when living as hunter-gatherers, but 
less so in the agrarian phase of societal evolution. The industrial revolution brought not only 
more material comfort, but also an unprecedented rise in happy life years (Veenhoven, 2008).  
  
9 DISCUSSION 
 
9.1 Limitations 
In his book The Pattern of Human Concerns, Headley Cantril (1965, p. 315) notes that 
“differences between individuals and groups are often easier to detect than the similarities 
they obscure.” An illustrative case is eating; cultural differences in eating behavior catch the 
eye: for example, when you find snake on your plate at a business dinner in China. Yet all 
humans want to eat, do eat, and need about the same nutrients. It is difficult to express this 
universality in numbers, since it depends rather on an interpretation of what is most essential. 
As such, my argument may not convince everybody. 
 A more tangible limitation is in the data used in this chapter. Since anthropology has 
failed to inform us about happiness in pre-modern societies (Thin, 2007), we must largely 
make do with data gathered in more or less modern societies, in particular in rich Western 
societies. The few studies of pre-modern societies I have mentioned (Biswas Diener, 2005; 
Kilpatric & Cantril, 1960) do not cover all the questions addressed here. Furthermore, the data 
are not free from cultural measurement bias. For instance: Latin Americans value positive 
affect more and may for that reason report more positive affect than Asians do (Diener & 
Oishi, 2004). Lastly, the question about variation across cultures is largely answered using 
data on happiness in nations. 
  
9.2 Why is the idea of cultural relativity so popular? 
In spite of these limitations, it is pretty clear that happiness is not only in the minds of 
Western people, and that there is a striking similarity in conditions for happiness across 
cultures. This elicits the question of why so many social scientists believe that happiness is 
culture-specific. One answer to that question is that theory plays them false; most social 
scientists have been raised with the idea that human experience is socially constructed and are 
trained to see human behavior as guided by malleable preferences. Another answer is a moral 
aversion to utilitarianism that gives rise to discounting the significance of happiness. I have 
discussed this question in more detail in Veenhoven (2006). 
 
10 CONCLUSION 
 
The available data suggest that all humans tend to appraise how much they like the life they 
live. In appraising life we draw on how well we feel in the first place, which in its turn draws 
on how well our universal human needs are gratified. The overall appraisal of one’s life draws 
less on cognitive comparison with cultural standards of the good life. Consequently, 
conditions for happiness appear to be quite similar across the world. The consequences of 
enjoying life are also largely universal. There is more cultural variation in the valuation of 
happiness and in beliefs about conditions for happiness. The greatest variation is to be found 
in how happy people are. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that appraisals of beauty are entirely culturally specific, since there is 
good evidence of universal tendencies on this matter. 
 
2 In other chapters of this book the term subjective well-being is used for this concept, while 
the terms happiness and life-satisfaction denote survey questions using these words. I 
cannot follow that terminology since this chapter draws on the World Database of 
Happiness, which is organized on the basis of a different idiom.  
 
3 There is some cultural variation in recognition of “fear,” “anger” and “disgust” in facial 
expressions (see, e.g., Russell, 1994). Still, the pattern is largely universal, and recognition 
of “happy” emotion stands out as the most universal. Expression of emotion may be more 
universal than the recognition of it in other people. 
  
4 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Current 
Happiness” (H6.2.2.2), one study that observed a correlation of +.56. 
 
5 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Current 
Happiness” (H6.2.2.3), one study. 
 
6 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Reputation of 
Happiness” (H8.2), four studies that observed correlations between +.43 and +.64. 
 
7 World Database of Happiness, States of Nations, Variable Happiness_DKLS_1980_2000. 
Average percent “don’t know” in 76 nations: 0.75; range, 0.4 to 4.5. 
 
8 Analysis of non-response to the questions on happiness and life-satisfaction in the World 
Values Survey shows some variation across cultures. The percentage of “don’t know” 
responses is slightly higher in nations where unhappiness prevails (r = +.10) and also 
higher in collectivist cultures (r = +.21). Still, these are variations on an otherwise 
universal pattern. 
 
9 The distinction between deficiency needs and growth needs is part of Maslow’s (1970) 
theory of human motivation. 
 
10 Rayo and Becker (2007) have a different view and argue that we are hardwired to 
compare and prefer the best, since this is evolutionarily advantageous. Their argument is 
appealing. Still, more is not always better and can even be detrimental. The tendency to 
compare can also be explained on the basis of innate needs that are not exclusively 
human, such as the need for social status and the need to use and develop one’s potentials. 
I do buy that we tend to see things in a comparative perspective, but see that rather as a 
consequence of cognition than as a “need” in itself. The distinction between consequences 
of human consciousness and innate “needs” is further discussed in the response to 
Question 5.  
  
11 This analysis involved eight studies, the results of which are summarized in the World 
Database of Happiness, Collection of Correlational Findings, Section H6.1.2, “Current 
Happiness: Overall Happiness by Hedonic Level of Affect.” The analysis is limited to 
                                                                                                                                                         
studies among general population samples using comparable single, direct questions on 
overall happiness (type O-HL, O-SL, O-DT, O-QOL) and affect (type A-AOL). 
Correlation with affect balance (type A-AB) is lower (+.50 in 70 studies), but in this case 
the correlation is depressed by the timeframe of the questions, which is typically ‘the last 
few weeks’. 
 
12 This analysis involved seven studies, the results of which are summarized in the World 
Database of Happiness, Collection of Correlational Findings, Section H6.1.3, “Current 
Happiness: Overall Happiness by Contentment.” The analysis is limited to studies among 
general population samples using comparable single, direct questions on overall happiness 
(type O-HL, O-SL, O-DT) and contentment (type C-BW). 
 
13 This analysis involved three studies, the results of which are summarized in the World 
Database of Happiness, Collection of Correlational Findings, Section H6.23 “Current 
Happiness: Hedonic Level of Affect by Contentment.” The analysis is limited to studies 
among general population samples. Hedonic level was measured using affect balance 
Scales (type A-AB) and contentment using the Cantril Ladder (type C-BW) and questions 
about perceived realization of wants (type C-RW).  
 
14 Wessman wrongly interpreted Table 44 as showing that unfulfilled aspirations go with 
unhappiness. 
 
15 World Database of Happiness, Happiness in Nations, Rank Report 2009-1. 
 
16 Similar results are obtained when average happiness is measured using an affect balance 
scale instead of a single direct question on satisfaction with life-as-a-whole (Variable in 
data file “states of Nations”: HappinessYesterdaysAffect3_2006).40 
 
17 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Personality, Inner 
Locus of Control (P4.58). For a recent cross-national study, see Verne (2008). 
 
18 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Current Income” 
(1.2). For a recent cross-national comparison, see Ball and Chernova (2008). 
 
19 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Current 
Occupational Level” (O1.3.1). 
 
20 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Subjective Social 
Rank” (S9.2.2). 
 
21 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject section “Objective Social 
Status” (S9.2.1). 
 
22 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Marital Status” (M2.1). 
See also Diener et al. (2000). 
 
23 Schimmack et al. (2002) found that the link between extroversion and hedonic level of 
affect is more universal than the link between extroversion and overall happiness and 
suggest that the influence of personality on the emotional component of happiness is pan-
  
cultural, whereas the influence of personality on the cognitive component of happiness is 
more moderated by culture. 
 
24 World Database of Happiness, States of Nations, variable r_LS_Education_1990. 
 
25 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Work 
Performance”(code W6.1.4). 
 
26 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Leisure”(code 
L3.1.4). 
 
27 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Friendships” (code 
F6.1.4). 
 
28 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Marriage” (code 
M1.4). See also Veenhoven (1989b). 
 
29 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Organizational 
Participation”(code S7.1.4). 
 
30 See, e.g., Isen (1998). 
 
31 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Later Physical Health” 
(code P6.1.4). 
 
32 World Database of happiness, Correlational Findings, subject “Longevity” (code 
P6.1.4.1). See also Veenhoven (2008b). 
 
33 This appears, for instance, in the history of philosophical thought. Happiness was a 
common theme in the prosperous Antique city societies, but disappeared in the dark 
Middle Ages and popped up again in the seventeenth century, together with a rise in 
quality of life of the new middle class.  
 
34 See, e.g., Bruckner (2000), and Wilson (2008). 
 
35 World Database of Happiness, Bibliography of Happiness, subject “Perceived Sources of 
Happiness” (code 15a2). For a recent review, see MacMahon (2008). 
 
36 World Database of Happiness, Bibliography of Happiness, subject “Perceived Sources of 
One’s Own Happiness (code 15c1). 
 
37 Overall happiness measured with a survey question on life-satisfaction. Average 
contentment, as measured with Cantril’s Best-Worst Possible Life question, is closer to 
neutral, which fits the prediction of comparison theory. 
  
38 World Database of Happiness, Happiness in Nations, Rank Report 2009-1. See also 
Diener, 1996.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
40 The data file “States of Nations” is available on request. The variables used here are: 
HappinessBWLS11_2006, RGDP_2000_2004, FreeEconIndex2_2002, 
DemocracyIndex2_2004, PeaceIndex_2007, Corruption3_2006, RuleLaw_2006, 
IncomeInequality1_2005, GenderEqualIndex2_2005, EduEnrolGross_2000_04, IQ_2006. 
These variables are described on the website: 
http://www.worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
 
 
Scheme 1
 
 
USA 
 
 
0.19% 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
0.26% 
 
China  
 
 
0.49% 
 
France 
 
 
0.65% 
 
Russia 
 
 
1.42% 
 
India 
 
 
2.69% 
 
Average in 78 nations 
 
 
0.75% 
 
Source: World Values Surveys, life-satisfaction item, average waves 1 to 4 
 
“Don’t Know” response to survey questions about happiness. 


     Zero order wealth controlled 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Wealth 
- Income p/c   +.79   -- 
 
 
Freedom 
- economic freedom  +.62   +.11 
- political freedom  +.50   +.07 
 
Peace     +.39   +.15 
 
 
Justice 
- corruption   -.77   -.14 
- rule of law   +.70   +.06 
 
Equality 
- income equality  +.27   -.33 
- gender equality  +.67   +.19 
 
Education 
- school enrolment  +.57   +.12 
- intelligence   +.63   +.21   
 
 
 
Source: World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2008, datafile States of Nations ) 40
 
Average happiness by societal characteristics in 136 nations 2006 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Scheme 4 

 
Denmark 
 
 
8.2 
 
Sweden 
 
 
7.7 
 
USA 
 
 
7.4 
 
Germany 
 
 
7.2 
 
France 
 
 
6.5 
 
Philippines 
 
 
6.4 
 
Japan 
 
 
6.2 
 
Turkey 
 
 
5.2 
 
Russia 
 
 
4.4 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
3.3 
 
Average in 86 nations 
 
 
6.5 
 
Source: World Database of Happiness, Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven, 2008). 
Scheme 6 
  Happiness in nations around 2000, averages on scale 0–10. 
 
